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A bstract
Currently the terms rif^ is  and  hum an rights are used to refer to  two types o f  entities. O ne is a kind  
o f  legal claim  or guarantee given in positive law. The other is a purported m oral claim  or interest 
im plicit in the nature o f  hum an  persons. A  peculiar feature o f  m odem  discussions o f  rights is that 
these diverse things are com m only  treated as i f  they had  som e necessary relation to one another. In  
fact, historically a nd  conceptually, they do  not a nd  the frequent attem pts to  relate them  can have 
in im ical results. It can coiifuse substantive hum an rights with the prom ulgation o f  an individualist 
view o f  the person.
The defence o f  hum an  rights (o f the types now  m entioned in international treaties) would be helped  
by d ivorcing  these  fr o m  a no tion  o f  inna te  rights and, instead, unders tand ing  rights as legal 
guarantees o f  ju s t political relations.
1. INTRODUCnON
In the world today and more especially, in South Africa today the most common way of 
ad d ress in g  n o rm a tiv e  issu es  in p o lit ic s  is by m eans o f  th e o r ie s  o f rights. 
Internationally, issues as diverse as trade, medical practice, housing, abortion, court 
procedure, and relations between the sexes are treated as matters of rights, specifically 
hum an  rights. In South Africa this list can be reproduced and expanded, and to it can 
be added especially the urgent resolution of the injustices wrought by racism and the 
im position of "separate development". Besides questions o f where one can live and 
work this involves the most basic matter of equality before the law.
Apart from the diffuse spread of a rights vocabulary in policy issues and matters of law, 
the notion of rights also has becom e central to many modern theories o f politics. 
Rights pervade the academy as much as the legislature, the court, the negotiating table 
and the street. Within left and right political thought, theories of rights are commonly
* This Iccturc was part o f the Stokerlesings o f the D epartm ent o f Philosophy at the PU for C U E  in 
A ugust 1990.
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used to explain the source of the state’s power, to define the task of the state, and to 
delineate the state’s proper jurisdiction.
One notable feature of these em phases is that human rights are affirmed by people  
right across the spectra of political opinion and ideology. For this reason they are 
often, indeed usually, offered as a unifying political creed. However, as I believe that 
p o litica l d ifferen ces are real, in the sense that they rep resent real c lashes o f  
com mitm ent and interest, then I am inclined to surmise that the claim ed, apparent 
consensus on rights may be somewhat hollow; the same words convey different mean­
ing to different people. When liberals and socialists reach agreement on human rights, 
have they settled their differences or merely found a new vocabulary in which to argue 
about their differences?
Another feature of rights is that, even apart from ideological divisions, there is diversity 
and confusion concerning to what they refer. There are first, second and third 
generations of rights; there are econom ic and social rights versus civil and political 
rights; there are rights understood as goals of state policy versus rights understood as 
jurisdictional lim its on state policy. At least there is agreem ent that there are 
substantial disagreements. There is one distinction, however, which most com menta­
tors agree is rarely, if ever, confused. This is the distinction between "innate right" and 
"positive rights". "Innate rights" (alternatively called "natural rights", "subjective rights", 
"moral rights" or "pre-political rights") are thought to be a type o f moral claim , 
somehow intrinsic to human beings, which entitle people to protection or provisions 
from states. "Positive rights" are claims guaranteed to people in positive law and 
capable o f sustaining a legal appeal. This distinction is hardly a subtle one and, 
whatever their diverse views on other matters, most commentators expressly point it 
out. However, I want to suggest that this distinction is commonly confused or, rather, 
conflated and that this confusion has been detrimental to the proper understanding 
and development of human rights. What happens is not that people assume that these 
two types of rights are identical but that they assume that they necessarily have a close 
connection. Those who are, very correctly, concerned with the protection of human 
rights in positive law often, very incorrectly, assume that such protection can only be 
justified  by or, at least, needs to be justified  by, or should be justified by som e  
conception of innate rights. Against this view I will maintain that
* no assertion of innate rights is necessary to found a good defence of positive rights;
* it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to found a view of positive rights on a 
view of innate rights, and
140 Koers 56(2) 1991:139-149
Paul Marshall
• to the degree that innate rights can found a view of positive rights, the results may 
be quite detrimental to genuine human freedom and flourishing.
G iven this situation, and given the importance of a good defence o f positive human 
rights, I will then suggest, briefly, how we might go about founding such rights. In 
doing so I will not be trying to suggest how to interpret human rights law but, instead, 
to suggest how such law should be formulated. However, before attending to my own 
proposals, I will address the relation of innate and positive rights.
2. INNATE RIGHTS A N D  POSITIVR RIGHTS
The distinct nature o f these two conceptions can be illustrated from their quite 
different histories. A  history of the substantive protection of human beings in positive 
law (i.e. positive human rights) would, in a Western setting, survey ancient legal codes, 
including the Torah, phases of the Greek polls, Roman law, tribal customs, common 
law, the Petition o f  R ight, grants o f religious toleration, the extension of suffrage, 
international treaties (such as those of The Hague and G eneva as well as explicitly 
human rights treaties), humanitarian law, and so forth. A second history could 
concentrate on justifications for such protection. If we limit our survey to the West we 
could look at Judaism and Christianity, views of justice and right in Greek philosophy, 
especially Stoicism, Augustine, Thomas and Islamic philosophy would be important. In 
general it would survey views of natural law, justice and the common good, and would 
include a large part of the history of political philosophy.
There could be a third history, a subset o f the second, that would trace the history of 
one type o f  ju stifica tion  for the positive human rights protection given in the first 
history. This particular mode of justification is a theory that ascribes rights to human 
beings apart from any consideration of positive law. It holds that human beings, as 
human beings, already have an entitlement which must be codified in positive law and 
that rights are thus pre-political. This type of theory includes conceptions of natural 
rights, innate rights, inherent rights, moral rights and subjective rights. Such a history 
would show the appearance of an idea of natural right (as distinct from justice, natural 
duty, natural law, or the right) in discussions by medieval canon lawyers and its further 
articulation in W illiam  o f Occam . It would follow  the secularisation of this idea 
through Grotius and its geometrication in Hobbes and Pufendorf. It would explore the 
idea of a rights based politics through Locke and Kant to contemporaries such as Alan 
Gewirth, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin.
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Perhaps the most ambitious recent attempt to found a notion of innate individual rights 
is that of Alan Gewirth, who claimed to derive a normative principle o f equal human 
rights solely from a consideration of the nature o f human action. By the use o f a 
dialectically necessary method he believed that one would proceed logically from the 
nature of agency to the claims by each agent to certain rights. By a similar process of 
logic one could establish that all other human beings have the same rights as oneself 
(Gewirth, 1981:119-147). Hence he believed that no one could, without selfcontradic­
tion, deny the reality of rights. However, as Alasdair MacIntyre pointed out in hi&After 
Virtue, not only is Gewirth’s logic faulty, b u t"... the possession of rights (presupposes) 
the existence o f a socially established set or rules ... They are in no way universal 
features o f the human condition ... those forms of human behaviour which presuppose 
notions of som e ground to entitlem ent, such as the notion of a right, always have a 
highly specific and socially local character, and ... the existence of particular types of 
social institution or practice is a necessary condition for the notion of a claim to the 
possession of a right being an intelligible type of human performance ... (MacIntyre, 
1981:65).
It would of course be a little odd that there should be such rights attaching to human 
beings simply qua  human beings in light o f the fa c t"... that there is no expression in any 
ancient or medieval language correctly translated by our expression ’a right’ until near 
the close of the middle ages ... From this it does not of course follow that there are no 
natural or human rights; it only follows that no one could have known there were" (op. 
cit.: 66-67).
MacIntyre’s view was echoed by A.I. M elden, who sought to demonstrate that there 
was no knowledge of human rights in the ancient world (M elden, 1988). Many years 
ago, Condorcet maintained that rights were absent from the legal conceptions o f the 
Romans and the Greeks, and equally from the Jewish, Chinese, and all other civilisa­
tions that had come to light.
Apart from the different histories of these conceptions, it is also true that somebody 
can hold to a view o f moral or innate or natural rights without claim ing very much 
about positive rights. John Wycliffe found dom inium  in the state of nature, but argued 
on the basis of Christian charity that one must not require any strong claim to property 
in positive law. His contemporary, Richard Fitzralph, also argued for dom inium  in the 
state o f nature but maintained that such lordship must now be held by the just, for we 
have fallen from that which was naturally given. Occam  him self, in arguing for a 
natural right of use, was not trying to establish a right in positive law. Rather, he was 
arguing for the right o f the Francisans not to have legal rights to private (or even
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common) property (M cGrade, 1980:149-165). The Franciscans argued that a positive 
right of property would undercut the natural right o f use. They wished to exclude such 
a right so that, effectively, they would remain in a state of nature. Thomas Aquinas 
argued for the natural com m on  possession of things but argued for positive individual 
possession on the grounds that it was more convenient and, while not taught in natural 
law, was not forbidden by it.
Not only have natural rights been used to justify something other than positive rights or 
positive human rights, but they have also appeared in opposition to what are regarded 
as positive human rights. The opposition to welfare rights (and, in the United States, 
even the idea of a welfare state) has often been ba.sed on fairly stringent natural rights 
grounds. Indeed the notion of a pre-political right held by an individual seems to be at 
variance with the idea of social or economic rights. While, perhaps, one can conceive 
o f freedom  as a right for a natural individual, it is much harder to envisage a pre­
political state which presumes political welfare arrangements.
This point can be made more stringently if we consider the Spanish debates on slavery 
in the early part of the sixteenth century (Tuck, 1979:48-50). The Spaniards, rather 
than trying to catch slaves, usually attempted to trade for already enslaved people on 
the coast o f Africa. This activity could, in principle at least, be justified if one could 
show that it was possible for people to have becom e slaves on legitimate grounds. In 
the ensuing arguments about the slave trade, natural rights theories played an impor­
tant part, but their part was one which tended to justify rather than oppose slavery. 
Those who held to natural rights views held that rights were like property, indeed that 
a pre-political right to property was the very epitom e of a right. People owned their 
rights and could dispose o f them. As rights were thought to inhere in the human 
person rather than in the civil order, then a person could legitimately sell them, forfeit 
them, or give them away. Thus a person could become a slave, a person without rights, 
in a quite legitimate way. Thus certain persons could justly be slaves, and trade in such 
slaves would be quite acceptable. These were slim grounds indeed, but grounds they 
were, and they were used. Indeed they were the same grounds as Suarez and Hobbes 
later used to justify political absolutism in a situation where, purportedly, an entire 
people, in order to receive protection, had traded away its rights in a social contract.
The principal argument against this confluence of slavery and rights was that of the 
Dominicans under the influence o f a revived Thomism. They, as christianized Aristo­
telians, were not enam ored of natural rights conceptions and placed much stronger 
limits on what people were free to do. H ence they argued that people were not, in
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general, free to dispose of supposed rights and were, consequently, not free to enslave 
them selves. T herefore it was unlikely that there could be legitim ate slavery and 
persons could not rightfully be traded as slaves. In this situation arguments against 
rights were arguments again.st the slave trade.
Natural rights theories can be equally a foundation for personal and social freedom or 
a foundation for authoritarianism or totalitarianism. In fact most early modern natural 
rights theories were justifications for authoritarian states: this is true for Suarez, 
Grotius and Pufendorf, as well as for Hobbes. The fact that many of the most brutal 
regim es in the world today proclaim their adherence to human rights Is not purely 
propaganda and bad faith, though it is surely that, but it is also a real facet o f the 
contradictions of contemporary rights theories.
One natural rights theory that, despite its other problems, did manage theoretically to 
limit the power of government was that o f John Locke. Locke, however, managed to 
do so only by lim iting freedom  In the first place. He began his Second Treatise on 
G overnm ent by pointing out such lim its. He reasserted that Adam  did not have 
dominion over the world (Locke, U.I.I). He affirmed that man’s liberty did not extend 
to his being able to destroy himself, for he was God’s property (op. cit. II.11.6). In sum, 
for Locke, "The state o f nature has a law of Nature to govern It, which obliges every 
one" (op. cit. I1.II.6). In Locke’s view it was not the case that all obligations rested on 
the mutual limitations o f the reciprocal wills of men expressed In a contract. There 
were other binding obligations which were prior to the contract. Consequently, In 
Locke’s theory, when mankind entered into a compact to make one "Body Politic" they 
were not free to erect whatever set o f arrangem ents accorded with their own wills, 
interests or calculations. "No body can give more Power than he has himself; and he 
that cannot take away his own Life, cannot give another power over it." (op. cit. II- 
IV.23). In Locke the limitations on government stemmed from the original limitation 
on people’s own rights in the state o f nature. What people did not have themselves 
they could not transfer to government. The liberties in Locke’s civil society stemmed 
from the limitations that were put on rights and freedoms in the first place. This was in 
stark contrast to H obbes, who imputed all power and rights to men in the state of 
nature and, through the contract, ended up with a government which was the embodi­
ment of all these rights and could do what It willed. In Locke the limitation of natural 
freedom, natural right, was the very thing that lead to a measure of politlclal freedom.
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3. RIGHTS A N D  LEGAL RELATIONS
When we speak of a right we cannot just speak of A ’s right, but we must also speak of 
A ’s right to B and, when we do so, we imply that C should respect this right, and 
perhaps that D should enforce it. A statem ent of right specifies a particular type of 
legal relation between A, B, C, D. It is difficult to see how a relation between many 
persons in differing circumstances could be found somehow to inhere in one of them  
(or even to be present in a natural, "pre-political", state at all) (Marshall, 1985:119- 
142). In treating a right as inherent in a person, what appears to have happened is that 
people have wanted to justify a particular kind of proper legal relation in society. In 
order to show that the legal relation is normative they argued that it was natural or 
innate, i.e. that it had some existence prior to the existence of social relations. Hence 
they "read back" the relation from a positive legal structure into a supposed "natural" 
condition.
Instead o f this process whereby a supposed moral right is then "read forward", 
"applied", extrapolated contextualized, or specified into a form of positive law, we need 
to give a much greater place to the actual p o litica l/leg a l/orm aíío/i o f rights. This 
requires at least a three stage process. Such a process is at once more cumbersome 
than many other rights views and it gives far greater actual creative power to political 
authorities. 1 say this by way of explanation, not apology, for such a multistage process 
is necessary, and is much closed to the actual everyday reality o f the formation of 
positive human rights law in both municipal and international settings. Even those 
who claim a form of innate rights usually have to follow a procedure similar to the one 
that I shall try to outline. The three stages are
* the specification of what it is that should be the object o f attention in human 
legislation,
the determ ination of the mode of judgem ent when we are concerned with the 
relations of more than one, when claims are in real or potential conflict, and
* the determ ination of the appropriate means of positivizing the determ inations 
which come from the second stage.
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4. A PRO CEDURE FOR SUGGESTING TH E CONCERN O F H U M AN RIGHTS 
LEGISLATION
While human rights do not inhere in the human person, nevertheless human rights are 
the rights o f human beings and so anthropology has to be a central factor in their 
discussion. We need to know what features o f the human person are of particular 
concern for rights. There is no shortage of candidates for such concern and this is one 
of the major areas of controversy in human rights debates. Suggestions offered include 
agency, autonomy, freedom, will, claims, needs and interests. Each of these suffer from 
problems. The concepts o f agency, autonomy, will and freedom are capable o f almost 
lim itless expansion and no such expanded conception seem s remotely susceptible to 
government guarantee. The bare notions of claims suffer from similar problems, for 
alm ost anything can and has been claim ed. Legal positivization is at the mercy of 
whatever claims are advanced, or most forcefully advanced. There is also the problem  
that those who cannot claim, such as babies, may be held to have no rights.
While this subject needs much more discussion, I will, in order to outline my proce­
dure, suggest and assume that the proper focus o f human rights legislation should be 
human need. This reflects, inter alia, the fact that concern for rights is founded in 
God’s grace rather than human merit. However, the criterion of need raises questions 
of its own. In particular it provokes the question "need/or what?" In order to answer 
this question we need to develop a contextualised view of an appropriate life o f and for 
human beings. I am not suggesting that people should be ordered to live such a life, 
but I am suggesting that any concept of need must necessarily specify a type of life to 
which the needs pertain. Otherwise each could demand their own personal definition.
The question of an appropriate human life can be approached in terms o f an under­
standing of human vocation or calling. Each person is called by God to be a servant of 
others as a neighbour, a citizen, a friend, a co-worker, a wife, husband, parent and/or  
child. Each person has a legitimate claim to be able to carry out these responsibilities. 
Hence 1 would suggest that the what-is-to-be-protected in human rights legislation is 
the ability o f each person to follow his life’s vocation, understood as a responsible 
pattern of life in community in a particular historical circumstance. Such a vocation is 
not to be demanded by law but is to be the matter of concern in legal rights. Hence the 
goal o f human rights legislation is to protect the legitimate interest and claim that each 
has in the meeting o f  their needs so that they m ay fu lfil  their vocation in a responsible  
manner. This may be called a "legitimate claim (See Feinberg, 1973:86f.).
But, of course, what I have suggested as the what-is-to-be-protected of rights will vary
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depending on the situation of others. What we are called to do depends on others and, 
given a world of scarce resources, what is available for us depends on the calling of 
others. In this case what may be appropriate to provide/protect for a person will 
depend on what other legitim ate claims are at stake. This provokes the question of 
how we deal with the relation of different claims rights, especially when what appears 
appropriate for each cannot be met for all. The response here needs to be in terms of 
what is appropriate fo r  each one considered together, and this points to the necessity of 
the criterion of justice (Stone, 1978:995-1024). Justice points to the manner and means 
of weighing different claims. Claims, in turn, as God-given areas of responsibility and 
authority, point to the limits of the state’s acting and to what it is that needs to be 
related in a just fashion. Hence the second stage is the just simultaneous interrelation 
of many legitimate claims.
What I have tried to describe so far is essentially a form of normative political decision 
making: what are we trying to protect, and how do we decide about com peting de­
mands for protection? Now we face the questions of formulating rights in positive law. 
One of the key features o f rights (emphasized by nearly all authors) is that they are 
basic (som etim es described as fundam en ta l, founda tiona l, inalienable) and should 
normally  win out over other considerations. This is why Ronald Dworkin calls them  
"trumps". This is a feature with which I have not dealt and so, the conception of rights 
that I am suggesting may seem frail or relativistic. However, as we have seen from the 
discussions of innate rights, the foundational nature o f rights does not lie in the fact 
that rights are epistemically or ontologically basic, or that they are the beginning point 
of a consideration of the nature of a just state. Rather the stress on the basic character 
of rights is that they are legally and politically important. Legal rights safeguard people 
from being oppressed by governments pursuing their own policies and goals. Rights 
provide a limit over which governments cannot trespass, or over which they can only 
trespass with great difficulty. The purpose of rights is to control governments and so, 
rights must be more basic than other forms of government activity, including govern­
ment laws. Hence the essential point is not that rights are basic moral concepts but that 
they shou ld  be p a rt o f  basic law, i.e. that the law should recognise rights, that the 
government should be subject to such law so that its policy is consistently and stably 
directed towards the m eeting of positive human rights, and that it is restrained from 
violating human rights in other aspects of its policy.
There are several ways of seeking to promote such legal safeguards. These include 
common law guarantees, legal principles, and even the practice of democracy itself. A 
com mon practice in the modern world is to place human rights guarantees within a
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constitution so that they are part o f the law over the government itself. This produces 
charters and bills o f rights. W hile such a charter is by no means a panacea, govern­
ment practice in South Africa sugge,sts that it is a necessity in this country.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have tried very briefly to sketch how we can arrive at an understanding of positive 
human rights. In the light o f this sketch we can say that positive human rights are legal 
guarantees o f the freedoms and the resources which must be protected for each person 
in the state, which are to be arrived at by a just adjudication of competing legitimate 
claims in recognition of the responsibility and authority of human persons to pursue 
their vocation. While no theoretical discussion is, in itself, sufficient basis on which to 
deal with a practical problem , this discussion does suggest som e things relevant to 
South Africa:
* W hether the claim s by certain Calvinists that a concern for human rights is 
"humanistic" has any validity with respect to a view of innate rights is, in terms of 
this paper, an open question . H ow ever, as a notion o f innate rights has no 
particular connection to a view  of positive human rights then such a point is 
irrelevant to the defense of the latter.
* W hile a stress on innate rights would not seem  to justify "second-generation" 
economic and social rights, the procedure I have outlined would justify such rights 
in particular circumstances.
* The formulation of positive human rights needs to be contextual and historically 
sensitive. While it is always to be guided by principle, it need not and should not 
be purely formal and the sam e at all times and all places. G iven South Africa’s 
history, human rights legislation here must stress the curtailm ent o f excessive  
legislative control and executive discretion. It must also have a particular focus on 
overcom ing racism as is suggested, for exam ple, in the African National Con­
gress’s recent "Constitutional G uidelines" and, to a lesser  extent, in Justice  
Olivier’s Law commission report.
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